Days Before VCRs, Chapter Four…Tactical and Strategic Innovations

While envisioned early on by the helo guys as a combat multiplier, the widespread use of night vision devices to gain a significant tactical and strategic advantage, was not always the “given” it appears today. Championed predominately by the helo community in the late seventies and early eighties as the way of the future, the integration of NVGs into the cockpit was costly. Crashes across the globe garnered Congressional attention, and the program was in danger of termination several times along the way. The cost in terms of equipment and personnel was high, yet the community and the Corps persisted. Eventually effective training practices were standardized and accident rates and risks were reduced to acceptable levels. Safe training parameters, cockpit modifications, minimum flight qualifications, and realistic training objectives paved the way for the effective and safe program of today.

Fixed wingers and ground forces also got on board. The overall investment, which was high in terms of men and material, yielded a huge advantage on the battlefield. The strategic and tactical implications of sustained night operations are dramatic. We are able to operate with impunity when a preponderance of the world’s forces must go into the defense…once in the defense; we have the ability to defeat them.

Modernizing our small arms weapons was also key. I am sure I won’t convince the die-hard M1911A1 guys, but moving to a common NATO ammunition set helps smooth logistics flow to the troops in contact, and reduces the potential for error. Updating the M-16, getting the SAW into the rifle squad, adding more firepower with the M19, all have improved the lethality of our troops in the field.

The Maritime Pre-Positioned Force helped improve response time to global crises, but it also created a focus on unit mobility and “mobility efficiency.” We simply got good at knowing what we needed to deploy, and then deploying it. Prior to this focus, deploying was a haphazard affair often resulting in essential equipment being left behind, unnecessary equipment being deployed when like equipment was available at the deployment site, and numerous lift aircraft sitting on our ramps waiting for us to get our clueless heads out of our butts.

Finally, the necking down of equipment of all types allowed the Corps to become a viable business entity, while sustaining muscle. During that period we went from A-6s, OV-10s, F-4s, A-4s to one tactical jet; reducing parts supplies, intermediate level repair footprint, GSE, IMRL equipment, and personnel, while getting an improved tactical capability. Other such consolidations took place throughout the Corps, this approach allowed us to reduce form 196,000 to our current strength without giving up combat capability.

Sometimes the clarity of the present belies the cloudiness of the past, and the rains of May ensure the rich harvest of the fall. Many Marines endured the gloomy and trying times of two decades ago, yet their professional approach to changing the Corps produced long-lasting and meaningful results. Not all of their efforts will be recognized, because many of theses changes have been so thoroughly integrated into the routine of the Corps, imagining their absence will be nearly impossible. In combination, the fundamental changes outlined over the past few posts smoothed out the many ruts in the road, and laid the foundation for the enormous success the Marine Corps has enjoyed over the past four years.

This is not a shameless grab for glory, for the accolades today MUST be given to the Marines in the field, but somewhere out there, there are a lot of Marines who helped get the Corps out of the doldrums and set it sailing on the course it is on today. Our Marines have performed impressively…as expected, but in doing so they have raised the standards for the Marines that will follow…as it has been for nearly 230 years.

© Michael McBride 2005